Don't 非難する us, 非難する the big boys

By THIS IS MONEY
Updated: 00:00 BST, 21 July 2002

?

HEDGE 基金s have been （刑事）被告 of destabilising the 株式市場 by selling 株 they don't own and 原因（となる）ing a run on individual companies and the market 全体にわたる.

This 落ちる has been created by several factors. Most important is a normal 是正 に引き続いて a bull market which has probably lasted from 1987 to 2000.

Bull markets tend to 隠す 法人組織の／企業の 超過 and 疑わしい accounting techniques. The i nability to 信用 the accounts of major 法人組織の／企業のs - exemplified by Enron in the US - 連合させるd with an end to the 平易な 伸び（る）s brought by rising markets, has 原因（となる）d a 危機 of 信用／信任.

The real question is whether the hedge 基金 産業 has had a 構成要素 影響 全体にわたる. In my 見解（をとる） it has not, for the に引き続いて 推論する／理由: the 全世界の hedge 基金 産業 is 比較して small. It manages about £400bn, which is いっそう少なく than 2% of liquid 資産s under 管理／経営 世界的な.

Hedge 基金s tend to be very proactive at identifying over-valued or under-valued 株 and it is （疑いを）晴らす that in some of the dotcoms and over-延長するd 科学（工学）技術 companies, such as Marconi, hedge 基金 投資家s were の中で the first to sell their shareholdings. But they are neither powerful enough nor foolish enough to attack or （警察の）手入れ，急襲 really sound companies.

We would find it hard not to sell sitting ducks, but it would 一般に take an 行為／法令／行動する of 甚だしい／１２ダース 管理／経営 folly or a 商売／仕事 that was 意味ありげに over-valued to create the sitting duck in the first place.

The main long-称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 players in the 公正，普通株主権 markets - 年金 基金s and 保険 companies - manage 30 times as much money as the hedge 基金 産業. Many have been 軍隊d to sell 公正，普通株主権s recently, partly because the 増加するing 成熟 of 年金 基金 members and 法律制定 has seen a 転換 into 社債s, 同様に as 支配するs 治める／統治するing the solvency 必要物／必要条件s of 保険 groups.

It is not （疑いを）晴らす what 衝撃 this institutional selling has had. But it does not take a genius to recognise that a major 削減 in 公正，普通株主権 holdings by groups owning more than 50% of 法人組織の／企業の UK has a bigger 影響 than hedge 基金s changing the 負わせるing on their 2% 株 of the 公正，普通株主権 markets.

So why do hedge 基金s make such convenient scapegoats? 明確に, we stand out from 従来の 基金 経営者／支配人s. We have tended to look bad because of a few スキャンダルs such as the 崩壊（する） of Long-称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 資本／首都 管理／経営 in 1998 - though with more than 6,000 hedge 基金s there are bound to be a few rotten apples.

にもかかわらず popular myth, many hedge 基金 経営者／支配人s are 規制するd. But usually their 基金s are not covered by onshore regulators, which means they can be sold only to sophisticated 豊富な 投資家s. This has 追加するd to the mystique of hedge 基金s, as has the fact that many 戦略s are 比較して コンビナート／複合体 and seem ultra-sophisticated to the layman.

So when a company 株 price 落ちるs and the 財政／金融 director asks why, his 仲買人 can appear 極端に erudite by 非難するing a hedge 基金. There will always be some truth in this, as any 井戸／弁護士席-capitalised, liquid 株 - 含むing our own Man Group 株 - will be held by hedge 基金s.

We are always mystified when our 株 go 負かす／撃墜する, so even we, the world's largest hedge 基金 経営者／支配人, call our stockbroker. Somehow we feel 安心させるd to hear that the 投資 community has not been downgrading its 見解（をとる） of Man's long-称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 prospects, but that any 株 price 落ちる has indeed been 原因（となる）d by - you guessed it - hedge 基金 selling.

? Stanley 密告者 is 長，指導者 (n)役員／(a)執行力のある of Man Group, the world's largest hedge 基金 経営者／支配人