Evidence of illegal software being loaded into ES&S optical scanners and tally machines can be seen in this article. ES&S Whisle Blower

 Now suppose many of these optical scan systems are connected into networks and that the manufactures have access to these networks. Then the patching can be done from a single site (say a school in Florida?). See Single Agent Hypothesis  for a theoretical look at what one person could do given access to an entire network of voting machines. Why would anyone try to change an election when a recount will discover the discrepancy and correct the count? The assumption must have been made that is the election is not close recounts won稚 happen. Recounts in elections are rare events and the perpetrators must have felt they could be avoided. We may yet see court challenges to recounts as we get close to the modified counts.

The first principals of machine recounts are 1) all machines involved in the recount must be isolated from all communications.  2) an audit must be made of all software in each machine.  3) each machine must demonstrate the ability to correctly count test ballots. If any of these conditions cannot be assured the result of the recount is as unknown as the original count.  Bev Harris, and we hope Ralph Nader, are going to do hand recounts of the actual original paper ballots to eliminate entirely the possiblity that the machines have influenced the recounts.  The American people will believe nothing less at this point.

In January 2004, Bay Point Schools installed a new computer lab consisting of twenty PCs a network (Internet) server and networking equipment.  Bay Point School Computer Lab This lab in located in West campus at 25005 SW 133rd Avenue, Princeton (Miami), Florida 33032. The network communications rack shown has a patch panel with 48 plugs (probably 100baseT) indicating that up to 48 devices can be attached locally to this network.  XXX told Fisher that Mel Sembler was helping the school acquire equipment needed for the planned election work.  The baypointschools domain was create Feb 1, 2000 and is currently hosted on readyhosting.com servers, not from this lab's server. 

It would be interesting to learn the communications bandwidth of the server's external Internet connection and to find the number of POTS (plain old telephone service) lines at this West campus.  Bev Harris has recommended that election officials disable modems connected to their election systems but the vendors probably have prevailed to leave these modems active for last minute emergencies and bug fixes.  Since there are probably hundreds of these modem equipted systems nationwide, a significant modem bank would be needed to download the "kernals" to all these systems just prior to the start of counting.  Might this modem bank be located in this computer lab?  XXX has indicated the there may be other schools involved but I would opt for the assumption that a single site was used.  This limits risk and a single site is all you need.

The early reports from New Hampshire are that no significant counts differences are being found.  If these recounts involve the suspect software modified optical scan equipment, has this recount equipment been subjected to the above tests? This report appears to imply that hand recounts are being done.  Early New Hampshire Recount

Implications for This Election

The election will proceed in its natural course of counting the provisional ballots, counting the absentee and mail in ballots, and resolving discrepancies in count totals. Where necessary recounts will occur with different types of voting technology including punch cards. Total recounts of votes on DRE equipment will not be possible since they lack voter verifiable paper. We may have been lucky this time assuming we assure that the recounts are done on honest equipment. In future elections widespread fraud involving DRE equipment without audits can result in perfect crimes. The optical ballots exist and can be recounted by hand or by honest optical scanners. We have every reason to hope that the original intent of all the voters can be recovered in a recount. Should major discrepancies exist between previously reported counts and recounts, then after the election investigations can be launched to discover why these discrepancies exist.

If anyone comes across information relevant to this continuing narrative please let me know so I can include it as the story unfolds. 

Send your comments to: Dennis Hall

Single Agent Analysis
 

Hypothetical analysis of the damage a single agent could potentially inflict on a national election.