Could we do it again? The MoD must 注意する the Defence Select 委員会's 報告（する）／憶測 on Libya
What excellent work the Defence Select 委員会 is doing. Its 報告（する）／憶測 on 操作／手術 ELLAMY ? Libya ? promulgated yesterday, is r
easoned, balanced and timely.
ELLAMY was in many 尊敬（する）・点s a brilliant demonstration of the RAF’s reach and 柔軟性. For all the 悪名高い feather-bedding of its ground 乗組員s, which routinely '狼狽s' (the real words cannot be printed in a family newspaper) the army and 王室の 海軍, and the 'Ryanair 顧客 relations' approach of its 空気／公表する-movements staff, and its institutional 急速な／放蕩な-jet fixation, the RAF is a magnificent service.
But although the 報告（する）／憶測 says the UK was able to 開始する 操作／手術s (含むing 海上の) in Libya while 実行するing the '軍の Standing 仕事s' and other 操作の かかわり合いs, it points out that ELLAMY was 行為／行うd 事前の to the 実施 of many of the 戦略の Defence and 安全 Review (SDSR) 決定／判定勝ち（する）s on 能力 削減s. The 報告（する）／憶測 ? 正確に (and 必然的に) ? goes on to say however that 'We believe the 政府 will 直面する 意味ありげに greater challenges should an 操作／手術 of 類似の size be necessary in the 未来 and it will need to be 用意が出来ている for some difficult 決定／判定勝ち（する）s on prioritization.'
柔軟性: RAF 台風 jets 準備する to take off to pa trol the no-飛行機で行く zone over Libya
In fairness to the 政府, prioritization was its watchword during SDSR. Andrew Robathan, one of the 大臣の team, said plainly at one point that 'It will mean 危険s, and I am not 危険-averse.'
罰金. As Moltke said: 'First reckon, then 危険.'
But SDSR, if it is to mean anything but just a spending 削減（する）, is a 過程. Indeed, the 政府 認めるs this in its かかわり合い to a quinquennial review. But 反して the US have enshrined a four-year review in 法律, and worked out its 機械装置, we have yet to 始める，決める a proper 時刻表／予定表. Without such a 時刻表／予定表 it will be difficult to make sense of 暫定的な 必要物／必要条件s as they are 明らかにする／漏らすd by events. Yet the Select 委員会 says that because ELLAMY raises 'important questions as to the extent of the 部隊d Kingdom's 国家の 次第で変わる／派遣部隊 能力' it 勧めるs the 政府 'to review the 部隊d Kingdom's capacity to 答える／応じる to concurrent 脅しs' and that this work should be '行為／行うd as a 事柄 of 緊急'. In other words it is first and 真っ先の calling for a 解明 of the quinquennial review 時刻表／予定表.
十分な stretch: An R AF トルネード，竜巻 jet 燃料再補給するs en 大勝する to Libya
However, the MoD is at 十分な stretch at the moment: (a) trying to make 貯金; (b) trying to manage the human 落ちる-out from the 貯金; (c) trying to 計画（する） how the services will 組織する themselves 地位，任命する-Afghanistan (the army 特に), while (d) carrying out a major 内部の 再組織 as a result of the Levene 報告（する）／憶測.
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It has little, if any, spare capacity for the staffwork needed for the 決定的な quinquennial review 時刻表／予定表. The 返答 of 大臣s tends therefore to be 'we’re managing 井戸／弁護士席 enough.'
The Select 委員会’s 報告（する）／憶測 is 説 that there may be events 一連の会議、交渉／完成する the corner that will 証明する this too 楽観的な. And also that the corner may be closer than supposed.
Scrapped: The RAF Nimrod 偵察 航空機
Perhaps the 選び出す／独身 most important area ーに関して／ーの点でs of 能力 ? rather than of just numbers of ships and 航空機 ? is that of ISTAR (知能, 監視, 的 取得／買収, and 偵察).
ISTAR sounds modern, but it’s as old as the hills ? never more aptly prioritized than by the Duke of Marlborough’s 'No war can ever be made without good and 早期に 知能.'
ELLAMY すぐに threw into 焦点（を合わせる） the price of losing Nimrod, both the 海上の patrol and the Sigint 見解／翻訳／版s. In articles どこかよそで at the time, I wrote that the axing (almost literally) of the Nimrod, without 交替／補充, was the 能力 loss that worried me most ? far more so than Harrier.? It was not surprising therefore that 早期に in the Libya 使節団 the MoD 発表するd an 拡張 in service of the Nimrod R1 Sigint 航空機, which had been 予定 decommissionin
g in 2011. The Select 委員会 報告（する）／憶測 says that 'ISTAR 能力 was 重要な to the success of the 操作／手術 as it 供給するd 効果的な 的ing and helped 最小限に減らす the 危険 of 非軍事の 死傷者s.'
Under 脅し: An RAF Sentinel 秘かに調査する 計画（する）
No surprise there. Indeed, if there is one 確かな bet in 未来 衝突 it is that ISTAR will be the 重要な ? just as it was in Marlborough’s day.
The Sentinel R1 航空機 also played 'a 重要な and pivotal 役割 in the 操作／手術' but is 予定 to be 閉鎖するd once its 役割 in Afghanistan ends. The 報告（する）／憶測 wants the MoD to '明らかにする the position on the 未来 of Sentinel and whether consideration is 存在 given to its retention and what 衝撃 retention would have on other 予算 areas.'
I 嫌疑者，容疑者／疑う that Sentinel could be 保持するd with but a small dent in 台風 numbers ? if not in actual airframes, because of contractual 義務s, then in 準備完了.
欠陥d 決定／判定勝ち（する） making: 影をつくる／尾行する Defence 長官 Jim Murphy
As for 海上の, the 報告（する）／憶測 引用するs the First Sea Lord, 海軍大将 Sir 示す Stanhope: 'Before Libya, we had already 認めるd stretch in our ability to 満足させる our かかわり合い to have a 軍艦 in the Caribbean during the ハリケーン season. We were covering that with the 王室の (n)艦隊／(a)素早い Auxiliary, which is 完全に 許容できる to do that 職業, although it did not 絶対 満足させる it. During the Libya 操作／手術, to 満足させる the standing overseas かかわり合いs, there was a need to 延長する some 操作の 仕事ing programmes. We had to 延長する time on 仕事 for some 部隊s and manage our way through the period of the Libya 危機.'
In other words, like Nelson, he has 'want of フリゲート艦s' carved on his heart.
I still do not understand the 海軍’s obsession with 航空機 運送／保菌者s at the expense of workaday ships at sea.
But the final word must go to the 対立 前線 （法廷の）裁判 and its 視野. Pity poor Jim Murphy: he has been given the 難破 of a 簡潔な／要約する ? the former 政府’s 破産者／倒産した defence '政策'. His welcoming of the 報告（する）／憶測 was a masterpiece: 'Our 軍隊s 成し遂げるd heroics and deserve all our 賞賛する, yet the 衝突 in Libya 後継するd in spite of 決定／判定勝ち（する）s made in the 政府's defence review' which was born of '限られた／立憲的な 国家の ambition 連合させるd with 欠陥d d
efence 決定／判定勝ち（する）-making'.
Really, Mr Murphy? Is that all that 原因（となる）d SDSR?
