Silicon Valley Bank 崩壊（する）: What you need to know
Two large banks that cater to the tech 産業 have 崩壊（する）d after a bank run, 政府 機関s are taking 緊急 対策 to backstop the 財政上の system, and US 大統領 Joe Biden is 安心させるing Americans that the money they have in banks is 安全な.
It is all eerily reminiscent of the 財政上の 炉心溶融 that began with the bursting of the 住宅 泡 15 years ago. Yet the 初期の pace this time around seems even faster.
Over the last three days, the US 掴むd the two 財政上の 会・原則s after a bank run on Silicon Valley Bank, based in Santa Clara, California. It was the largest bank 失敗 since Washington 相互の went under in 2008.
How did we get here? And will the steps the 政府 明かすd over the 週末 be enough?
Here are some questions and answers about what has happened and why it 事柄s:
? Why did Silicon Valley Bank fail?
Silicon Valley Bank had already been 攻撃する，衝突する hard by a rough patch for 科学（工学）技術 companies in 最近の months and the 連邦の Reserve’s 積極的な 計画（する） to 増加する 利益／興味 率s to 戦闘 インフレーション 構内／化合物d its problems.
The bank held billions of dollars 価値（がある） of 財務省s and other 社債s, which is typical for most banks as they are considered 安全な 投資s. However, the value of 以前 問題／発行するd 社債s has begun to 落ちる because they 支払う／賃金 lower 利益／興味 率s than 類似の 社債s 問題／発行するd in today’s higher 利益／興味 率 環境.
That is usually not an 問題／発行する either because 社債s are considered long 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 投資s and banks are not 要求するd to 調書をとる／予約する 拒絶する／低下するing values until they are sold. Such 社債s are not sold for a loss unless there is an 緊急 and the bank needs cash.
Silicon Valley, the bank that 崩壊（する）d on Friday, had an 緊急. Its 顧客s were 大部分は start-ups and other tech-centric companies that needed more cash over the past year, so they began 身を引くing their deposits. That 軍隊d the bank to sell a chunk of its 社債s at a 法外な loss, and the pace of those 撤退s 加速するd as word spread, 効果的に （判決などを）下すing Silicon Valley Bank insolvent.
? What did the 政府 do on Sunday?
The 連邦の Reserve, the US 財務省 Department, and the 連邦の Deposit 保険 会社／団体 (FDIC) decided to 保証（人） all deposits at Silicon Valley Bank, 同様に as at New York’s 署名 Bank, which was 掴むd on Sunday. 批判的に, they agreed to 保証（人） all deposits, above and beyond the 限界 on insured deposits of 250,000 dollars (£205,000).
Many of Silicon Valley’s start-up tech 顧客s and 投機・賭ける 資本主義者s had far more than 250,000 dollars at the bank. As a result, as much as 90% of Silicon Valley’s deposits were uninsured. Without the 政府’s 決定／判定勝ち（する） to backstop them all, many companies would have lost 基金s needed to 会合，会う payroll, 支払う／賃金 法案s, and keep the lights on.
The goal of the 拡大するd 保証（人）s is to 回避する bank runs ? where 顧客s 急ぐ to 除去する their money ? by 設立するing the Fed’s かかわり合い to 保護するing the deposits of 商売／仕事s and individuals and 静めるing 神経s after a harrowing few days.
Also late on Sunday, the 連邦の Reserve 始めるd a 幅の広い 緊急 lending programme ーするつもりであるd to shore up 信用／信任 in the nation’s 財政上の system.
Banks will be 許すd to borrow money straight from the Fed ーするために cover any 可能性のある 急ぐ of 顧客 撤退s without 存在 軍隊d into the type of money-losing 社債 sales that would 脅す their 財政上の 安定. Such 解雇する／砲火／射撃 sales are what caus ed Silicon Valley Bank’s 崩壊（する）.
If all 作品 as planned, the 緊急 lending programme may not 現実に have to lend much money. Rather, it will 安心させる the public that the Fed will cover their deposits and that it is willing to lend big to do so. There is no cap on the 量 that banks can borrow, other than their ability to 供給する collateral.
? How is the programme ーするつもりであるd to work?
Unlike its more byzantine 成果／努力s to 救助（する） the banking system during the 財政上の 危機 of 2007-08, the Fed’s approach this time is 比較して straightforward. It has 始める，決める up a new lending 施設 with the bureaucratic moniker Bank 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 基金ing Programme.
The programme will 供給する 貸付金s to banks, credit unions, and other 財政上の 会・原則s for up to a year. The banks are 存在 asked to 地位，任命する 財務省s and other 政府-支援するd 社債s as collateral.
The Fed is 存在 generous in its 条件: It will 告発（する），告訴（する）／料金 a 比較して low 利益／興味 率 ? just 0.1 百分率 points higher than market 率s ? and it will lend against the 額面価格 of the 社債s, rather than the market value. Lending against the 額面価格 of 社債s is a 重要な 準備／条項 that will 許す banks to borrow more money because the value of those 社債s, at least on paper, has fallen as 利益／興味 率s have moved higher.
As of the end of last year US banks held 財務省s and other 安全s with about 620 billion dollars (£509 billion) of unrealised losses, によれば the FDIC. That means they would take 抱擁する losses if 軍隊d to sell those 安全s to cover a 急ぐ of 撤退s.
? How did the banks 結局最後にはーなる with such big losses?
Ironically, a big chunk of that 620 billion dollars in unrealised losses can be tied to the 連邦の Reserve’s own 利益／興味 率 政治家 icies over the past year.
In its fight to 冷静な／正味の the economy and bring 負かす／撃墜する インフレーション, the Fed has 速く 押し進めるd up its （判断の）基準 利益／興味 率 from nearly 無 to about 4.6%. That has 間接に 解除するd the 産する／生じる, or 利益／興味 paid, on a 範囲 of 政府 社債s, 特に two-year 財務省s, which topped 5% until the end of last week.
When new 社債s arrive with higher 利益／興味 率s, it makes 存在するing 社債s with lower 産する／生じるs much いっそう少なく 価値のある if they must be sold. Banks are not 軍隊d to recognise such losses on their 調書をとる／予約するs until they sell those 資産s, which Silicon Valley was 軍隊d to do.
? How important are the 政府 保証（人）s?
They are very important. 合法的に, the FDIC is 要求するd to 追求する the cheapest 大勝する when winding 負かす／撃墜する a bank. In the 事例／患者 of Silicon Valley or 署名, that would have meant sticking to 支配するs on the 調書をとる／予約するs, meaning that only the first 250,000 dollars in depositors’ accounts would be covered.
Going beyond the 250,000 dollar cap 要求するd a 決定／判定勝ち（する） that the 失敗 of the two banks 提起する／ポーズをとるd a “systemic 危険”. The Fed’s six-member board 全員一致で reached that 結論. The FDIC and the 財務省 長官 went along with the 決定／判定勝ち（する） 同様に.
? Will these programmes spend taxpayer dollars?
The US says that 保証（人）ing the deposits will not 要求する any taxpayer 基金s. Instead, any losses from the FDIC’s 保険 基金 would be 補充するd by 徴収するing an 付加 料金 on banks.
Yet Krishna Guha, an 分析家 with the 投資 bank Evercore ISI, said that political 対抗者s will argue that the higher FDIC 料金s will “最終的に 落ちる on small banks and Main Street 商売／仕事”. That, in theory, could cost 消費者s and 商売／仕事s in the long run.
? Will it all work?
Mr Guha and other 分析家s say that the 政府’s 返答 is expansive and should stabilise the banking system, though 株 prices for medium-sized banks, 類似の to Silicon Valley and 署名, 急落（する），激減（する）d on Monday.
“We think the 二塁打-barrelled bazooka should be enough to 鎮圧する 可能性のある runs at other 地域の banks and 回復する 親族 安定 in the days ahead,” Mr Guha wrote in a 公式文書，認める to （弁護士の）依頼人s.
Paul Ashworth, an 経済学者 at 資本／首都 経済的なs, said the Fed’s lending programme means banks should be able to “ride out the 嵐／襲撃する”.
“These are strong moves,” he said.
Yet Mr Ashworth also 追加するd a 公式文書，認める of 警告を与える, 説: “Rationally, this should be enough to stop any contagion from spreading and taking 負かす／撃墜する more banks … but contagion has always been more about irrational 恐れる, so we would 強調する／ストレス that there is no 保証（人） this will work.”
