Modi's Indian Ocean 小旅行する is a wise and timely move?

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総理大臣 Narendra Modi’s visit to the Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka was timely and multi-dimensional.?

The Sri Lanka visit could be 見解（をとる）d, at one level, as part of his 焦点（を合わせる） on the neighbourhood and Saarc.?

By 招待するing Mahinda Rajapaksa, the former Sri Lankan 大統領，／社長, to New Delhi for his 断言するing-in 儀式, Modi began 解放する／自由なing himself from the growing 支配する of Tamil Nadu politics on our 外交政策 に向かって Sri Lanka.?

総理大臣 Narendra Modi during his 最近の Sri Lanka 小旅行する

大統領 Sirisena’s visit to India last month 確認するd that New Delhi will henceforth まず第一に／本来 決定する the level of 約束／交戦 between the two countries.?

It also carried the message that the course of India’s 拒絶する／低下するing 戦略の 影響（力） in Sri Lanka under Rajapaksa was 存在 逆転するd.?

By himself visiting Sri Lanka so soon thereafter, 演説（する）／住所ing the Sri Lankan 議会, and visiting Jaffna, Modi has を強調するd India’s 新たにするd high-level political attention to the country and the relevance of its 建設的な 役割 in 解決するing the 民族の 問題／発行する 疫病／悩ますing it.?

招待s

The Mauritius 首相 had been 招待するd to Modi’s 断言するing-in 儀式 too, but outside the Saarc 枠組み, the justification 存在 the exceptional nature of 関係 between India and a country with an Indian-origin 大多数 全住民.?

Modi was 権利 in giving special attention to this strategically-placed country in the Indian Ocean at the start of his 任期 and 受託するing, as a return gesture, the 招待 to be the 長，指導者 guest at its 国家の Day 祝賀s.?

One can 解釈する／通訳する the Mauritius visit, too, as an 演習 to 強固にする／合併する／制圧する 関係 with a country that may not be in South Asia, but which has special せいにするs that qualify it as an intimate “隣人”.?

At another level, the visit to these three countries signifies 高くする，増すd attention to our 批判的な 利益／興味s in the Indian Ocean area. These 含む seaborne 貿易（する） and energy flows, the 管理／経営 of 海洋 資源s and 海軍の （軍隊などの）展開，配備s.?

The 本体，大部分／ばら積みの of our 貿易（する） ― 77 per cent by value and 90 per cent by 容積／容量 ― is seaborne. Our energy 安全 is 伴う／関わるd as India’s oil 消費 is rising 毎年 and we might be the world’s largest importer of oil by 2050.?

India’s 分散させるd island 領土s, its lo ng coastline and 抱擁する 排除的 経済的な Zone, its 沖合いの／海外の oil 資産s and 漁業 利益／興味s, all point to the necessity of 持続するing a stable and 安全な・保証する 海上の 環境.?

The Indian 海軍 is 促進するing this through 増加するd 二国間の／相互の/ 多国間の 演習s, 含むing MILAN in which 17 地域の 海軍s 参加するd off the Andaman coast in February 2014.?

The Indian Ocean 海軍の 討論会, 設立するd in 2008, has now 35 countries as 関係者s. Modi was the first Indian 首相 to visit Seychelles in 34 years, which 論証するs our neglect of the Indian Ocean area at a high political level, keeping in 見解（をとる） Chinese 大統領，／社長 Hu Jintao’s visit to the island in 2007 and 報告（する）／憶測s that in November 2011 a 供給（する） base had been 申し込む／申し出d to the Chinese 海軍 for its anti-piracy patrols in the 湾 of Aden.

During his visit, Modi 焦点（を合わせる）d on 海上の 安全 by 調印 a 協定／条約 on a 沿岸の 監視 レーダ 事業／計画（する） and 発表するing the 供給（する） of another Dornier 航空機. He placed this in the 状況 of 実行するing “our 株d 責任／義務 to 前進する 海上の 安全 in the 地域”.?

In Mauritius, Modi 調印するd an 協定 on 開発 of Agalega Island, 法案d as a major stride in India-Mauritius 協調 in the 組織／基盤／下部構造 部門. He also …に出席するd the （売買）手数料，委託（する）／委員会／権限ing of Barracuda, a 1,300-tonne Indian-built patrol 大型船 ship for the country’s 国家の Coast Guard, with more such 大型船s to follow.?

Modi 明言する／公表するd eloquently, as is his wont, that the 運命s of India and Mauritius were “linked by the 現在のs of the Indian Ocean”.?

によれば 外務大臣 Sushma Swaraj, Modi’s visit to Seychelles and Mauritius was ーするつもりであるd to 統合する these two countries in our ３カ国間の 海上の 協調 with Sri Lanka and Maldives.?

繁栄?

At still another level, Modi’s visit to these three countries ― Maldives was omitted from the 旅程 because of the 内部の political 危機 there ― should also be placed in the 状況 of the 高くする，増すd 戦略の importance of the Indian Ocean 地域 に引き続いて the remarkable growth of 経済的な activity and 繁栄 in the Asian 地域 in 最近の １０年間s.?

中国’s 出現 as the world’s second largest economy and the biggest 輸出（する）ing 力／強力にする has made this area even more strategically 重要な because of the 大規模な Chinarelated 貿易（する） and energy flows through it, not to について言及する those of Japan ― the world’s third largest economy ― and South Korea.?

In fact, the world’s major Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) 横断する the Indian Ocean, with almost 50 per cent of 全世界の merchant shipping passing through the Malacca 海峡s.?

拡大?

中国 is 増加するing its presence in the area, and this will grow as its 海軍の capacities 拡大する and along with it its political ambitions as a rising 広大な／多数の／重要な 力／強力にする. It is cultivating, and will do so ますます, those very strategically-placed countries in the Indian Ocean that are important for India’s 安全.?

Its $40-billion 海上の Silk Road 事業／計画（する）, which is 経済的な, political and 結局 軍の in sco pe, parades its ambitions.?

Already in Sri Lanka, India and Chinese 戦略の 利益／興味s have 衝突／不一致d, with a Chinese 潜水艦 ドッキングする／減らす／ドックに入れるing in Colombo twice and major Chinese 投資 支出s in ports and 組織／基盤／下部構造 in the country 原因（となる）ing us 関心.?

Although the new Sri Lankan 政府 is reviewing a major Chinese 投資 事業／計画（する） ― and to that extent India’s sensitivities are 存在 taken on board ― the challenge to Indian 利益／興味s in the Indian Ocean will remain as 中国’s 事業／計画（する） is long 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 and is 支援するd by 抱擁する 財政上の 資源s, which in turn, gives strength and 信用性 to its 外交.?

Moreover, the more we open ourselves to Chinese 投資s, the more our 対立 to Chinese 事業／計画（する）s in our periphery will seem inconsistent. We have major challenges ahead.?

The writer is a former foreign 長官