REVEALED: Why the doomed El Faro 貨物 ship sailed 権利 into a ハリケーン before 沈むing in the Bermuda Triangle with all 33 souls lost

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The author of a new 調書をとる／予約する about the 沈むing of the El Faro has 申し込む／申し出d insights into why the ship sank and what could have saved the 33 乗組員 members who died at sea.

新聞記者／雑誌記者 Rachel Slade, the author of?Into The 激怒（する）ing Sea: Thirty-Three 水夫s, One Megastorm And The 沈むing Of El Faro, says that both 'hubris' and the 40-year-old ship's age were 重要な factors.

The?790-foot 貨物 ship sank in the Bahamas on October 1, 2015 in the 中央 of ハリケーン Joaquin while on a 貨物 run from Florida to Puerto Rico.

'We don’t have 40-year-old cars anymore on the road. They’re considered antiques,' Slade said of the El Faro's age in an interview with?Maine Public. 'You can no longer order parts for that ship. The guys were 現実に using scrapped pieces from scrapped ships to 直す／買収する，八百長をする the engine, to 直す／買収する，八百長をする parts. This was a desperate 状況／情勢.'

Slade said that the ship was not 初めは designed to carry コンテナs above deck, but instead to carry 負わせる low, with trailers 運動ing into the 持つ／拘留する.

'When containerization took over in the 中央の ’70s the El Faro was 修正するd. Now she’s carrying 負わせる 異なって ― she’s got コンテナs up high, she’s got trailers 負かす／撃墜する below, but she still has that profile that’s やめる 狭くする,' Slade said .?

Doomed:?The 790-foot El Faro went 負かす／撃墜する on the morning of October 1, 2015 in the worst 貨物 shipping 災害 伴う／関わるing a US-flagged 大型船 in more than three １０年間s

新聞記者／雑誌記者 Rachel Slade (left), the author of a new 調書をとる／予約する about the 沈むing of the El Faro (権利), says that both 'hubris' and the 40-year-old ship's age were 重要な factors

'As 水夫s would say she was "tender," which means that she was very responsive to changes in 勝利，勝つd and waves, and steering changes, 反して these large コンテナ ships now are chubby and much more stable,' the author said.

Slade also said that 乗組員 疲労，（軍の）雑役 and the captain's hubris, both 明らかにする／漏らすd in 発言する／表明する tapes from the 橋（渡しをする） 解放（する）d last year, played a 重要な 役割 in the 災害.

'People are exhausted. And you can tell when you’re reading the transcript of the 記録，記録的な／記録するing how tired and exhausted the people are on the ship,' said Slade. 'It’s 現実に very upsetting to read because you can only imagine that they’re not 機能（する）／行事ing with all pistons 解雇する／砲火／射撃ing.'

She said poor 決定／判定勝ち（する）s played a 重要な 役割 同様に. 'There was hubris invol ved, "We can 扱う this. The ship can 扱う this. We are solid 乗組員 or 勇敢に立ち向かう 乗組員. We’re going to be 承認する." This had not happened, and was in their lifetimes almost 前例のない,' Slade said of the 乗組員.

But the 新聞記者／雑誌記者 認めるd that?Captain Michael Davidson was balancing competing 危険s under 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の 圧力: the 危険 of putting the ship and 乗組員 in danger, and the 危険 of ドッキングする／減らす／ドックに入れるing late in Puerto Rico, 潜在的に costing his 雇用者 TOTE hundreds of thousands of dollars and putting his own 職業 on the line.

'I can’t imagine the 圧力s, and it takes a very strong person to be able to say no we’re taking the 安全な 大勝する,' Slade said.?

This graphic, 解放（する）d by the NTSB on December 13, 描写するs the 場所s of the El Faro Oct. 1, 2015, 親族 to the 場所s of ハリケーン Joaquin

最終的に, Slade believes that covered lifeboats might have saved the 乗組員, if they had been 要求するd as they are for modern 貨物 ships.

'Any ship built after 1986 now has to have enclosed lifeboats. I would argue that those 水夫s might have had a fighting chance if they had enclosed lifeboats on El Faro,' said Slade.??

Last month, Captian Davidson's final words in a 苦しめる call were 明らかにする／漏らすd.

El Faro Captain Michael Davidson told his 接触するs 岸に that he was in '生き残り 方式' in his last call out before the ship sank in 2015, 殺人，大当り all 33 on board??

Captain Davidson made the call at around 7.05am to Captain John Lawrence, his 接触する 岸に who worked for shipping company TOTE.?

Captain Davidson thought he would be able to bypass the ハリケーン instead of 会合 it 長，率いる on and his underestimation of its strength 連合させるd with his 信用／信任 in El Faro's 速度(を上げる） have been 非難するd for the 悲劇.

捜査官／調査官s also 明らかにする／漏らすd that a loss of lubrication which 原因（となる）d engine 失敗 was another 重要な factor.

The Coast Guard is now 警告 ships to 再考する their designs in light of it.?

El Faro's lubricating system was essentially ripped from its oil source by the ハリケーン. It 原因（となる）d its steam engine to shut 負かす／撃墜する and left the 乗組員 fully exposed to the ハリケーン with no way out.?

In his call to shore before he 溺死するd, Captain Davidson said he 手配中の，お尋ね者 to '押し進める that button', referring to?an electronic 苦しめる signal.

Before hanging up, he said: 'O.K. I just 手配中の，お尋ね者 to give you that 儀礼 so you wouldn’t be blindsided by it, and have the 適切な時期.?Everybody’s 安全な 権利 now. We’re in 生き残り 方式 now.'

A minute later, the ship sent out a 苦しめる 衛星 signal and thirty seconds after that, they 問題／発行するd a 安全 警報 to the Coast Guard with their 調整するs.

A diagram 解放（する）d by the Coast Guard this week shows how El Faro's lubrication systems were ripped from their oil source (底（に届く）) as the ハリケーン 動揺させるd the 大型船. It 原因（となる）d its engines to fail

Pictured: The 回復するd 難破させる of El Faro after it was swallowed by a ハリケーン in October 2015, 殺人，大当り all 33 people on board?

By 7.39am, the ship and all of its 33 乗組員 had been （海，煙などが）飲み込むd by ハリケーン Joaquin which they had inadvertently sailed 直接／まっすぐに in to, 430 miles southeast of Miami.

Captain Davidson's final calls to people on the shore were 明らかにする／漏らすd by Vanity Fair.

They show how he 持続するd a procedural トン にもかかわらず the ぼんやり現れるing 災害 which was the worst US 海上の 出来事/事件 in three １０年間s.

He made his first 試みる／企てる to raise Lawrence, who was the person he was to call for communications, at 6.59am but it was never 選ぶd up.

When the call went to voicemail, Captain Davidson left the に引き続いて message:

'Captain Lawrence? Captain Davidson. Thursday morning, 0700. We have a navigational 出来事/事件. I’ll keep it short.

'A scuttle popped open on two-deck and we were having some 解放する／自由な communication of water go 負かす／撃墜する the three-持つ／拘留する. Have a pretty good 名簿（に載せる）／表（にあげる）. I want to just touch―接触する you 口頭で here. Everybody’s 安全な, but I want to talk to you.'

He then called a dispatcher at TOTE to try to get through again and pleaded 猛烈に to be put in touch with a 'QI' - qualified individual - with whom he could discuss the 緊急.

'This is a 海洋 緊急. Yes, this is a 海洋 緊急,' Captain Davidson said.

As the woman asked him questions, he became ますます 緊急の.

'Oh man! The clock is ticking! Can I please speak to a Q.I?' he cried before （一定の）期間ing out the ship's 指名する: 'Echo Lima Space Foxtrot Alpha Romeo Oscar!'

Later, he told her: 'I have a 海洋 緊急 and I would like to speak to a Q.I. We had a 船体 違反―a scuttle blew open during a 嵐／襲撃する.

'We have water 負かす／撃墜する in three-持つ／拘留する with a 激しい 名簿（に載せる）／表（にあげる）. We’ve lost the main propulsion 部隊.

'The engineers cannot get it going. Can I speak to a Q.I., please?'

That is when he was 結局 patched through to Lawrence.

The data recorder from the sunken 難破 of the 貨物船 El Faro 残り／休憩（する）s in fresh water after 存在 回復するd in the 大西洋 Ocean in August

He told him: 'Yeah, I’m real good. We have, uh, 安全な・保証するd the source of water coming into the 大型船. A scuttle was blown open by the water perhaps, no one knows, can’t tell. It’s since been の近くにd. However, three-持つ／拘留する’s got a かなりの 量 of water in it. We have a very―very healthy port 名簿（に載せる）／表（にあげる）.

'The engineers cannot get lube-oil 圧力 on the 工場／植物, therefore we’ve got no main engine. And let me give you a latitude and longitude. I just 手配中の，お尋ね者 to give you a 長，率いるs-up before I 押し進める that―押し進める that button.

'The swell is out of the northeast. A solid 10 to 12 feet. Spray. High 勝利，勝つd. Very poor visibility. That’s the best I can give you 権利 now,' he said.

As they spoke, Lawrence began to 高く評価する／（相場などが）上がる the 真面目さ of the 嵐／襲撃する.

'Yup, what I 手配中の，お尋ね者 to do. I wanna 押し進める that button,' he said.

Lawrence 答える／応じるd: 'You do your thing, captain.'

Captain Davidson thought he would be able to bypass the worst of the ハリケーン before it slammed into the Bahamas but was fatefully mistaken.

As it happened, El Faro and ハリケーン Joaquin met 長，率いる on, something he had not 心配するd.

Along with his final 苦しめる calls, 捜査官／調査官s used 29 hours of 音声部の from the ship' s voyage data recorder to piece together what went wrong.

It 明らかにする／漏らすd that Davidson 辞退するd to listen to 乗組員 members as they 示唆するd changing course.??

The 海上の 災害 （人命などを）奪う，主張するd the lives of 33 men and women, some of them pictured and identified here: Second mate Danielle Randolph (left), 乗組員 member Jeremy Riehm, 46, from Bokeelia, Florida (中心), engineer?Michael Holland (権利), 25

Jeffrey Mathias, 42 engineer (left), 乗組員 Steve Shultz, 51 (cent er), Keith Griffin, 33, engineer (権利)

Larry Davis, 62, 乗組員 member (left), Mariette Wright, 51, sailor (中心), Shawn Thomas (権利) was an oiler who worked in the ship's engine room

Shaun Rivera, 32, cook (left), Dylan Meklin, 23, engineer (中心), Roosevelt 'Bootsy' Clark, 38 (権利), a longtime sailor and aspiring preacher

Frank Hamm, 49, merchant 海洋 (left), 乗組員 Jackie 'Pops' Jones, 38 (中心), James Porter, 40, merchant 船員 (権利)

Howard Schoelny (left), 50, was an engineer on the ship and was 述べるd as 'an incredible person' by his brother. Carey Hatch, 49 (権利), worked at the Jacksonville's Seafarers Union Hall

Jeffrey Mathias, 42 engineer (left), 乗組員 Steve Shultz, 51 (中心), Keith Griffin, 33, engineer (権利)

The recordings 明らかにする／漏らす that at least two 最高の，を越す 乗組員 members tried in vain to 納得させる Davidson to change course as ハリケーン Joaquin drew 近づく, but Davidson 拒絶するd those suggestions, 納得させるd that El Faro will be 60 miles south of the 注目する，もくろむ of the 嵐／襲撃する and 'should be 罰金.'

At 11pm on the eve of the 沈むing, a third mate called the captain twice, 示唆するing that he alter course 予定 to the 天候 条件s, 報告（する）／憶測d WABI-TV.

About two hours later, Davidson’s second mate called him, 説 he should alter course because new 天候 data showed the ハリケーン was 製図／抽選 近づく.

But the captain 主張するd to stay the course, believing that the ship would be 安全な south of the 嵐／襲撃する.?

In fact, El Faro ended up 存在 22 miles north-northwest of the 中心 of the ハリケーン when it sank. ?

'We're gettin' 相反する 報告（する）／憶測s as to where the 中心 of the 嵐／襲撃する is,' Davidson told his 長，指導者 mate at 5.03am, によれば the transcript. The alarm to abandon ship sounded about 2-1/2 hours later.?

The transcript, the longest one ever produced by NTSB 捜査官／調査官s covering 10 hours and drawn from six microphones on the ship's 橋（渡しをする）, may be 決定的な in 決定するing why the ship sailed の近くに to the 嵐／襲撃する's 中心 and why it was unable to withstand it, NTSB 公式の／役人s said at a news 会議／協議会 broadcast online.

CBS News 報告（する）／憶測d that the VDR transcript shows the captain ordering 乗組員 members to abandon ship and get into life rafts.?

Later, Davidson tells someone, 'You gotta get up. You gotta snap out of it? and we gotta get out.'

At one point, a helmsman said, 'I’m a goner' and another helmsman asked the captain, 'You gonna leave me?'

A closeup 見解（をとる） of the El Faro 航海 橋（渡しをする） is shown on the ocean 床に打ち倒す taken by an underwater ビデオ camera November 12, 2015

The transcript ended on a 冷気／寒がらせるing 公式文書，認める, with Davidson telling an 明らかに panic-stricken 乗組員 member: 'Don’t 凍結する up ... I’m not leaving you. Let's go'

NTSB 公式の／役人s 公式文書，認めるd that the transcript is fractured.?

In the 決定的な hours before the deadly 沈むing, it is pocked with conversations that 捜査官／調査官s could not 完全に make out because of background noise or distance from microphones.

One question 捜査官／調査官s are trying to answer is which 天候 data the El Faro 乗組員 relied on.?

Davidson received data by email that was six hours behind other （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状） the 乗組員 received, 公式の／役人s said.

'There were many sources of 天候 （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状）. In 設立するing what was likely 見解（をとる）d by さまざまな members of the 乗組員 at 明確な／細部 times during the voyage, that is part of the NTSB's 現在進行中の 調査,' James Ritter, director of the NTSB's Office of 研究 and 工学, said at the news 会議／協議会.

A data recorder, 含むing the 発言する／表明する 記録，記録的な／記録するing from the 橋（渡しをする）, was 回復するd from the 難破 about 15,000 feet below the surface of the ocean last summer.

Thomson Reuters Eikon data 以前 明らかにする／漏らすd that the El Faro was sailing at 近づく 十分な 速度(を上げる） into the 中心 of the 嵐／襲撃する, raising questions about the captain's voyage 計画（する）.?